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Abstract
This paper investigates the government’s optimal
subsidy and tax policies in response to consumer
environmental
awareness
(CEA)
and
the
manufacturers’ product selection (generic, green or
both) plus quality and pricing decisions. We derive the
equilibria under different policy combinations and
derived the analytical and numerical solutions. We find
that (1) subsidizing and taxing consumers is more
social beneficial when the potential market share of
green products is small and environmental technology
is high; (2) subsidizing green-product consumers and
taxing manufacturers who produce ordinary products
can yield higher social welfare; (3) subsidizing and
taxing manufacturers may be more social optimal
when either CEA or consumer awareness of traditional
quality is high.

1. Introduction
Subsidy and tax policies are important instruments
adopted by governments to stimulate green technology
development. For example, the U.S. government
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009, which granted a tax credit to
consumers who purchased electric vehicles [8]. FeedIn-Tariff is a policy instrument to attract investments in
renewable energy by offering long-term guaranteed
purchase agreements to green power producers to sell
their electricity into the grid [2, 12, 15]. Gasoline taxes
and carbon tax are added in the fuel price considering
that greenhouse gas emissions from human activities in
particular carbon dioxide (CO2) are responsible for the
current observed global warming [1].
However, no policy is completely efficient.
Diamond & David (2009) concluded that there is a
strong relationship between gasoline price and hybrid
adoption, but a much weaker relationship between
incentive policies and hybrid adoption. Gallagher &
Muehlegger (2011) showed that conditional on value,
sales tax waivers are associated with more than a ten-
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fold increase in hybrid sales relative to income tax
credits. Lobel & Perakis (2011) examined that the
current policies in Germany for the adoption of solar
photovoltaic technology are not efficient. Therefore, in
this paper, we focus on comparing the efficiency
government policies (tax and subsidy) in stimulating
the demand and supply of green products, and discuss
the optimal polices with different environmental level
product.
Consumer environmental awareness (CEA) is
another important factor affect green product demand.
The rise of consumer environmental awareness (CEA)
has changed consumer behavior. The BBMG
Conscious Consumer Report shows that 67% of
Americans agree that it is important to buy products
with environmental benefits and 51% are willing to
pay more for products with high environmental quality
[3]. Considering the impact of CEA, researchers started
to introduce environmental quality as a demand
enhancement factor in the product demand function
[14].
In response to the government’s policy and rising
CEA, manufacturers adapt their strategies by adjusting
product prices and green product quality [7,20]. For
example, in 2012, Honda Fit EV model was quickly
sold out in Southern California after offering sizable
leasing discounts [11]. Feed-In-Tariffs attracts a wide
range of manufacturers to invest in renewable energy
(such as PV) [2]. Manufacturer will introduce green
product based on the ordinary product line with stricter
environmental emission standard, given the green
product subsidy or ordinary tax set out by the
government [7, 18, 20]. The manufacturer decides how
to set green product’s environmental quality and price
with policy instruments and CEA are need to solve for
the manufacturers.
In this paper, we assume the manufacturer can
choose to produce the variety of products: ordinary
product or green product, consumers with different
CEA will determine which product to purchase;
government will provide subsidy or tax in order to
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improve social welfare. We mainly investigate the
following questions:
1. How instruments policies affect social welfare
with manufacturer’s product strategy and CEA?
2. How environmental quality and price of green
product change with CEA and instruments policies?
3. What are the optimal policies with different
CEA and environmental level of green product?
We incorporate CEA and the quality of the green
product into the demand function. This study compares
two scenarios: (i) subsidy to green consumer and tax to
ordinary consumer, (ii) subsidy to manufacturer who
produces green product and tax to manufacturer who
produces ordinary product. We derive the closed-form
expressions of price with quality. Then we present the
changes of optimal subsidy and tax by using numerical
examples and further give the zone division with
different CEA.
Our paper differs from the literature in the
following ways: (1) we compare the effectiveness of
the government’s subsidizing and tax policies
regarding green products when the policies instrument
to different objects while previous studies only focused
on one particular object [7,17,1]; (2) we incorporate
environmental quality and CEA into demand function
to observe the change of manufacturer’s strategy
change, while other demand models assume that green
demand is fixed [7,18,20,12]; (3) we present the
optimal policies with different CEA and green
products, while other literature with fixed green
product and CEA [2,6,9,10].
There are four main findings: (1) subsidizing and
taxing to consumer is more beneficial when the
potential market share of green products is small and
environmental technology is high; (2) whenever
government implements policy to consumer or
manufacturer, the social welfare in concave with
government subsidy and tax; (3) subsidy to green
consumer and taxing to manufacturer who produces
ordinary product could obtain high social welfare and
environment quality; (4) government should subsidize
manufacturer when green product has the low marginal
profit; then, government should transfer from subsiding
the manufacturer to consumers when the price of green
product increases.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model description. Section 3 and 4 present
manufacturer’s product strategy when the government
implements policy to consumer and manufacturer,
respectively. Section 5 describes numerical examples.
Section 7 summarizes our main findings and concludes
the paper by providing some directions for future
research. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.

2. Model
We start by explaining the different components of the
environmental products, consumer utility, and social
welfare.

2.1. Products
We assume that a monopolist offers a specific
class of durable products with two competing
attributes, the traditional and environmental attributes,
over which individuals may express quantifiable
preferences. Given the assumption that both attributes
behave like “qualities” (i.e., consumers who value each
attribute prefer higher levels to lower levels on the
attribute), we will from now on call them traditional
and environmental qualities (denoted by qt and qe ).
For example, qt and qe can represent the levels of
safety rating and fuel economy of a vehicle, which
usually conflict with each other [7,18]. Additionally,
qt and qe can represent the specified levels of any
competing traditional and environmental qualities,
such as the material consistency and recycled content
of a durable product. In order to capture the
relationship between traditional and environmental
qualities, we assume qt  rqe  1, r  1 , because the
technology of environmental quality improvement is
costly, so the one unit improvement of environmental
quality is always accompany with more units of
traditional quality decrease, which is different from [7].
The monopolist intends to supply all the customers
in the market with either an ordinary product or
multiple product type(s). The cost of supplying a
product increases as a quadratic function with respect
to the levels of its two qualities. That is, the unit cost of
a product with qualities qt and qe is

ct qt2  ce qe2 ,

where ct and ce are positive cost coefficients. Assume
that there is a fixed cost F associated with introducing
any product type (for R&D and other relevant
expenses). Assume further that there are no economies
of scale so that unit cost is independent of the number
of units produced.

2.2. Demand
We assume that demand of each product is
impacted by its price and quality. When manufacturer
provides two substitutable products, one product’s
demand is also affected by another product’s price and
quality. With the considerations of price competition
and the demand enhancement due to ecofriendly
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improvement, we give demand functions for green
product and ordinary product, denoted by
Dg  a g  bg p g   g po  k gt qtg  k ge qeg  l gt qto  l ge qeo
Do  ao  bo po   o p g  kot qto  koe qeo  lot qtg  loe qeg

where ai is initial market potential of product i, i=o or
g, where represent ordinary product or green product,
respectively; bi is product i’s demand sensitivity to

i is product i’s demand sensitivity
product j(j=o or g and j  i ),

price of product i,
to price of

welfare,
environmental
welfare
caused
by
environmental improvement, and the government
income. The third item is sometime included in the
second item, for example [4], however, we separate it
in order to observe the effect of the environment
change obviously. The value of the weight reflects the
government emphasis on one party. For example,
1  2 / 5,  2   3   4  1/ 5, then we refer to a
government as industry-friendly. The borderline case
 n  1/ 4, n  1, 2,3, 4 constitutes the benchmark. In
this case, we label the government as neutral.

k gt , k ge represent green consumer’s sensitivity to the
traditional quality and environmental quality of
environmental product, kot , koe represent ordinary
consumer’s sensitivity to the traditional quality and
environmental quality of ordinary product, l gt , l ge are
green consumers’ sensitivity to the traditional quality
and environmental quality of
ordinary product
and lot , loe are ordinary consumers’ sensitivity to the
traditional quality and environmental quality of green
product, respectively. Notice that bi   i ,

kit  lit and kie  lie , because product i’s price and
quality has more influence than his competitor’s price
and
quality.
We
assume
that
ai  bi pi  i p j  0 and Di  0 .
Our demand model is a linear stochastic model
with substitution: (i) the expected demand of a product
decreases with its price; however how the
improvement of environmental quality impacts demand
depends on consumers’ emphasis on environmental
quality and traditional quality; (ii) the price of one
product increases the mean demand of the other
product; however, whether the environmental quality
of one product increases or decreases the mean demand
of the other product still depends consumers’
preference. Our demand model is inspired by [5,15].
We assume that there is no repeat purchase, i.e.,
customers will leave the market forever after they have
bought a unit of the product, regardless of the product
type.

2.3. Government policy
We use t  0 and s  0 to denote the tax rate and
the subsidy rate, respectively. The government aims at
maximizing the weighted aggregate social welfare
W  1   2U   3 D(E)   4 (tQt  sQe ) (1)
Similar to [19], the government's objective (1) can
be decomposed into industry welfare, consumer

2.4. Timing
Decisions take place in four stages.
Stage I, the government chooses the object of
subsidy and tax policy: consumer or manufacturer.
Stage II, the government decides the tax rate t or
subsidy rate s.
Stage III, the monopolist manufacturer decides to
produce traditional product or environmental product,
and determine the product environmental quality and
price.
Stage IV, consumer decides to purchase the
traditional product or green product.

3. Subsidy and tax to consumer
In this subsection, government subsidize to
consumer who purchase environmental product and tax
to consumer who purchase ordinary product.
Manufacturer could choose to produce one productenvironmental product or traditional product, two
products-environmental product and traditional
product.
We assume that price of traditional product is fixed
because of full market competition, then manufacturer
focuses on determine price and quality of
environmental product given government policy.
In this section, consumer who purchases green
product will obtain subsidy s, the subsidy may be price
subsidy or other discount policy (e.g. the Electric
Vehicle could obtain free license in Shanghai, China),
hence subsiding to consumer increases total demand.
Consumers who purchases ordinary product will be
taxed t; when the manufacturer produces two products,
there is product substitution; therefore, the demand
functions with subsidy and tax are as follows:
D g  a g  bg ( p g  s )   g ( po  t )  k gt qtg  k ge qeg  l gt qto  l ge qeo
Do  ao  bo ( po  t )   o ( pg  s )  kot qto  koe qeo  lot qtg  loe qeg

Manufacturer may produce traditional product, green
product or both of them. We will present three
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scenarios, then give manufacturer’s optimal strategy
with government policy.

 2 (qeg , pg )  [ag  bg ( pg  s)   g ( po  t )  kgt qtg  kge qeg  lgt qto  lge qeo ]( pg  ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2 )

3.1. One product-ordinary product

s.t.

In this scenario, manufacturer only produces
ordinary product, then demand function of ordinary
product is
Do  ao  bo ( po  t )  kot qto  koe qeo ,
Then we can give manufacturer’s profit as follows,
1o  [ao  bo ( po  t )  kot qto  koe qeo ]( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2 )  F
s.t.

q  rq  1 .
o
t

o
e

 [ao  bo ( po  t )  o ( pg  s)  kot qto  koe qeo  lot qtg  loe qeg ]( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2 )  2F

qtg  rqeg  1 .

Proposition

2.

k gt r  k ge  2rbg ct  0 and

If

2ce k gt  ag (ce  ct r 2 )   o ce 2 qeo 2  bg ct (ce  r 2 s)  bg ce s  rct k ge  celge qeo
 celgt qto  (ce po  ct po r 2 )( o   g )  (k ge  k gt r ) 2 / 2bg  3ce k ge / r  3bg ce 2 / r 2
ct qto 2 (r 2 o  ce o )  ct r 2 (lge qeo  lgt qto )  ce ct o qeo 2 r 2  t g (ct r 2  ce )  0

, then manufacturer’s profit function
g

is joint concave with qe

The manufacturer’s profit decreases with tax.

 2 (qeg , pg )

, pg .

Theorem 2. When government chooses to subsidize
environmental consumer and tax to traditional
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is

3.2. One product-green product
In this scenario, manufacturer only produces green
product, then demand function of green product with
government subsidy is

Dg  ag  bg ( pg  s )  k gt qtg  k ge qeg ,

p*g 

ag   g ( po +t )  bg s  k ge qge  k gt qtg  lge qeo  lgt qto   o ( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2 )  bg (ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2 )
2bg

the optimal environmental quality

qeg2* is determined

d 2 (qeg , p*g )

0.
by
manufacturer’s profit function is as follows
g
1g (qeg , pg )  [ag  bg ( pg  s)  k gt qtg  k ge qeg ]( pg  ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2 )  F dqe
Remark 1. The price difference between
g
g
s.t. qt  rqe  1 .
government policy and with subsidy and tax is
Proposition

1.

k gt r  k ge  2rbg ct  0 and

If

p

2ce k gt  a g ( ce  ct r 2 )  bg ct ce  rct k ge  ( k ge  k gt r ) 2 / 2bg  3ce k ge / r ,
3bg ce 2 / r 2  bg ct r 2 s  bg ce s  0

joint concave with q

 ( q , pg )
g
1

g
e

is

, pg .

Theorem 1. When government chooses to subsidize
environmental consumer and tax to traditional
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is

p 
*
g

ag  bg s  k ge qge  k gt qtg  bg (ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2 )
2bg
g*

, the optimal environmental quality qe1 is determined
g
g
*
by d1 (qe , pg )

dqeg

s t g

,
2 2bg

g*

then manufacturer’s profit function
g
e

no

 0.

3.3. Two products-ordinary product and green
product
In this scenario, manufacturer produces both green
product and ordinary product, with government
subsidy and tax to consumers, the manufacturer’s
profit function with two products is given as follow,

if qe keeps a constant.
Both subsidizing to environmental consumer and
taxing to traditional consumer increase price of green
product, and the demand of green product increases
sbg t g ), the demand of ordinary product
(
Dg 

2



2

decreases ( D  b t   g o t  s o ).
o
o
2bg
2
The manufacturer will choose the optimal product
strategy by comparing profits of above three scenarios.
Substituting firm’s product strategy including product
variety, product quality and price, then the social
welfare is as follows:
W ( s, t )  1   2 [( pomax  po ) Do / 2  ( p gmax  p*g ) Dg / 2]
,
  3 ( Dg qeg  Do qet )   4 (tDo  sDg )

government as the Stackelberg leader will determine
the optimal subsidy and tax to maximize social
welfare. We give the solution algorithm to seek the
optimal subsidy and tax because of the complexity of
analytic solutions.
Algorithm 1.
Step 1:
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For s=0:0.2:smax
for t=0:0.2:tmax
solve

d1 (qeg , p*g )
dqeg

 0,

d 2 (qeg , p*g )
dqeg

 0, obtain

qeg1* , pg1 and qeg2* , pg 2 ;
compute

In this subsection, manufacturer only produces
ordinary product, the marginal profit of one unit
ordinary product with government tax is,

po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2  t ,
hence manufacturer’s profit is as follows,
 1' o  (ao  bo po  kot qto  koe qeo )( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2  t )  F

 1o ,  1g ( qeg1* , p*g1 ) ,  2 (qeg2* , p*g 2 ) , and

social welfare

W1o ,W1g ,W2 ;

end
end

s.t.

qto  rqeo  1 .

Because of the full competition, we assume that
price and quality of ordinary product are given, then
manufacturer’s profit decreases with tax.

4.2. One product—green product
Step 2:
Return the maximum of

W1o ,W1g ,W2 ,

corresponding

( s1o , t1o ), (qeg1* , pg1 , s1g , t1g ), (qeg2* , pg 2 , s2 , t2 ) ;
and manufacturer’s profit

1o ( s1o , t1o ) ,  1g (qeg1* , pg1 , s1g , t1g ) ,
 2 (qeg2* , pg 2 , s2 , t2 ) ;

In this scenario, manufacturer only produces green
product, then the profit of one unit green product with
government subsidy is,

pg  ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2  s ,
The manufacturer’s profit function is as follows,
1' g (qeg , qtg , pg )  (ag  bg pg  kgt qtg  k ge qeg )( pg  ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2  s)  F

s.t.

qto  rqeo  1 .
Proposition 3. If k gt r  k ge  2 rbg ct  0 and

Step 3:
Compare and get the maximum profit

2ce k gt  ag (ce  ct r 2 )  bg ct ce  rct k ge  (k ge  k gt r )2 / 2bg  3ce k ge / r

 (qeg * , pg * , s* , t * ) =max{  1o ( s1o , t1o ) ,

3bg ce 2 / r 2  bg ct r 2 s  bg ce s  0

 1g (qeg1* , pg1 , s1g , t1g ) ,  2 (qeg2* , pg 2 , s2 , t2 ) },

, then manufacturer’s profit function

then the optimal environmental quality, price, subsidy

joint concave with qe

g*
e

*

*

and tax is q , pg , s , t , and the welfare is

W ( s , t ,  ( q , pg , s , t )) .
*

*

g*
e

*

*

*

4. Subsidy and tax to manufacturer
In this section, government subsidize to
manufacturer who sells one unit environmental product
and tax to manufacturer who sells one unit traditional
product. Similar to Section 3, manufacturer could
choose to produce one product-environmental product
or traditional product, two products-environmental
product and traditional product.
The demand function will not alter directly because
the government tax and subsidize directly to
manufacturer, however, manufacturer will change
products’ price with government policy, hence,
government policy changes demand function
indirectly. Considering manufacturer’s three choices,
we will discuss each scenario in following subsections.

g

 1' g (qeg , pg )

is

, pg .

Theorem 3. When government chooses to
subsidize environmental consumer and tax to
traditional consumer, then green product’s optimal
price
is
g
g
g2
g2
a

k
q

k
q

b
(
c
q

c
q

s
)
g
ge e
gt t
g
t t
e e
,
pg'*1 
2bg
the optimal environmental quality
by

d1' g (qeg , p*g )
dqeg

qeg1* is determined

 0.

4.3. Two products-ordinary product and green
product
In this scenario, manufacturer produces both green
product and ordinary product, with government
subsidy to green product and tax to ordinary product,
we can present manufacturer’s profit function with two
products is given as follow,

4.1. One product—ordinary product
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 2' (qeg , qtg , pe )  [ag  bg pg   g po  kgt qtg  kge qeg  lgt qto  lge qeo ]( pg  ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2  s)
 [ao  bo po  o pg  kot qtg  koe qeg  lot qto  loe qeo ]( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2  t )  2F

s.t. qt  rqe  1 .
Proposition

4.

k gt r  k ge  2rbg ct  0 and

If

2ce k gt  ag (ce  ct r 2 )   o ce 2 qeo 2  bg ct ce  rct k ge  celge qeo
c l q  (ce po  ct po r )( o   g )  (k ge  k gt r ) / 2bg  3ce k ge / r  3bg ce / r
o
e gt t

2

2

2

2

g

joint concave with qe

 2' (qeg , pg )

is

, pg .

Theorem 4. When government chooses to subsidize
environmental consumer and tax to traditional
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is
p g'*2 

a g   g po  k ge q ge  k gt qtg  l ge qeo  l gt qto   o ( po  ct qto 2  ce qeo 2  t)  bg (ct qtg 2  ce qeg 2  s )
2bg

, the environmental quality

d 2' (qeg , p*g )
g
e

dq

qe' g2* is determined by

no

s t
p  o ,
2 2bg

if

qeo  0, qto  1,  g   o  0.2, k ge  1, k gt  1, kot  2, koe  0, lgt  lot  0.2,

From Table 1, we can see that when the number of
the potential green consumer is much smaller,
subsidizing and taxing to consumer is the optimal
government policy; as the number of the potential
green consumer increases, government should change
from subsidizing to consumer to subsidize and tax to
manufacturer.
In both scenarios, the price, firm’s profit and social
welfare increases with ag , however, the environmental
quality keeps a constant with

0.

Remark 2. The price difference between
government policy and with subsidy and tax is

The
parameters
are
set
as
follows:
ao  60, bg  bo  2, r  2, po  20, ce  20, ct  5, F  50,
1
lge  loe  0.1, smax  10, tmax  10，1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = ， =100 .
4

ct qto 2 (r 2 o  ce o )  ct r 2 (lge qeo  lgt qto )  ce ct o qeo 2 r 2  bg ct r 2 s  bg ce s  tce o  ct r 2 ot  0

, then manufacturer’s profit function

green product), and present the change of the optimal
solutions with ag .

qe' g2* keeps constant.

Subsidizing to manufacturer who produces green
product reduces price of green product, and taxing to
manufacturer who produces ordinary product also
enforces manufacturer decreases price of green
product. Therefore, both subsidy and tax have positive
effect on increasing sales of green product.
Similar to Section 3, the manufacturer will choose
the optimal product strategy by comparing profits of
above three scenarios. Then the government gives the
optimal subsidy and tax according to the welfare
function. We omit the solution algorithm to seek the
optimal subsidy and tax similar to Algorithm 1.
Because the complexity of the analytical solutions,
we will give some numerical examples to illustrate the
results obtained in Section 3 and 4.

5. Numerical Examples
In this section, we will verify the results obtained in
Section 3 and 4, compare the two policies more
intuitive.

5.1. Optimal government policy

ag .

When the government determines to subsidize
green consumers, the optimal subsidy should decreases
with ag , and there should no tax to ordinary consumer
when the number of green consumer excesses a
threshold point.
When the government implements policies to
manufacturer, the optimal subsidy and tax achieve its
upper limits with ag . When ag is much smaller, the
manufacturer will only produce ordinary product. The
firm begins to produce when ag is large enough, and
the optimal policies is to subsidy and tax to
manufacturer.
Therefore, when the number of the green consumer
is small, it is much better to subsidizing and tax to
consumer; when the number of the green consumer is
very large, subsidy and tax to manufacturer is the best
choice.
Table 1. Optimal policies with ag
I Subsidize and tax to consumer

ag

qeg

p

10
20
30
40
50
60

0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24

9.1
12.1
14
16
18
20

Profit/
product
variety*
135
397
485
590
709
845

Optimal
policy

(s,t)

welfare

(8.4,5.6)
(8,0)
(7,0)
(6,0)
(5,0)
(4,0)

172
148
190
240
299
365

I
I
II
II
II
II

In this subsection, we will present the optimal
subsidy and tax policies, product quality and price of
green product (if manufacturer determines to produce
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II Subsidize and tax to manufacturer

ag

qeg

p

10
20
30
40
50

0.24
0.24
0.24

60

0.24

(s,t)

Optimal
policy

5.24
7.74
10.14

Profit/
product
variety
280/o
280/o
367
371
624

0
0
(10,10)
(10,10)
(10,10)

100
100
298
507
456

I
I
II
II
II

12.64

812

(10,10)

548

II

5.3. Comparison between
consumers and manufacturer

policy

to

welfare
In this subsection, we compare the price, profit,
social welfare and environment quality between
subsidy/tax to consumer and manufacturer. Let
ao  30, ag  20, bg  bo  1, r  2, po  15, ce  20, ct  10, F  20,

qeo  0, qto  1, g  o  0.2, k ge =koe  1, k gt  kot  2, lgt  lot  0.2,

1
2
lge  loe  0.1, 1 = 2 = 3 = ,  4 = ,  =100.
5
5

Price

Note*: ‘o’ represents manufacturer only produce
ordinary, ‘g’ represents green product, if there is no ‘o’
and ‘g’, it represents manufacturers produces two
products.

5.2. Social welfare change with subsidy and tax
In this subsection, we present the change of social
welfare with subsidy and tax to consumer. When the
social planner applies these policies to manufacturer,
the changes of welfare are similar to above results, so
we omit them. The parameters are set as follows:
ao  30, ag  20, bg  bo  1, r  2, po  15, ce  20,

Figure 2. Price as a function of s

ct  10, F  20, qeo  0, qto  1, g  o  0.2,
1
2
lge  loe  0.1，1 = 2 = 3 = ， 4 = ， =100.
5
5
Figure1 shows that the social welfare is joint
concave with s and t. It compares the social welfare
change with different three policies: a). with subsidy
and tax; b). with only subsidy; c). with only tax. It
shows that the social welfare will not obtain maximum
when social planner only uses subsidy, similarly, the
social welfare will not obtain maximum when social
planner only employs tax.

Profit

k ge =k oe  1, k gt  k ot  2, l gt  lot  0.2,

Figure 3. Profit as a function of s
two products
green product
ordinary product

160

Welfare

140

140
135

120

130

100

125

80

120

60

115

40

110

20
20

to consumer
to manufacturer

105
15

10

5

s

0

5

t

Figure 1. Welfare as a function of t and s

10

100
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

s

Figure 4. Welfare as a function of s
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116
114
S o c ia l W e lfa re

Let t = 0, Figures 2-4 compare the price of green
product, profit, and social welfare between government
subsidy to consumer and subsidy to manufacturer when
manufacturer provides two products. We can see that
the profit and welfare are bigger when government
subsidizes to consumer.
Let s = 0, Figures 5-7 show the changes of price of
green product, profit, welfare and environmental
quality with t when manufacturer provides two
products, each figure gives two policy: tax to consumer
and tax to manufacturer. We can see that taxing to
traditional consumer has no effect on price of green
product, however, taxing to manufacturer decreases
green product’s price. Taxing policy decreases
manufacturer’s profit and increases social welfare.
Therefore, when the government intends to implement
tax to improve environment quality and social welfare,
taxing to manufacturer may be more beneficial.

to consumer
to manufacturer
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Figure 7. Welfare as a function of t

5.4. Optimal policy with division zone
In this subsection, we show how the optimal policy
changes with the parameters. First, we apply numerical
to the analytical results derived in Section 4, and then
present the optimal policy with potential demand of
green product and ordinary product, and then we
explore the effect of CEA and consumer awareness on
traditional quality on government policy. The
parameters
are
set
as
follows:

Price

bg  bo  2, r  2, po  20, ce  20, ct  5, F  50, qeo  0, qto  1,

 g   o  0.2, k ge =1,koe  0, k gt  1, kot  2, lgt  lot  0.2,

Figure 5. Price as a function of t

2
1
lge  loe  0.1, 1 = ,  2 = 3 = 4  ,  =100.
5
5
When the number of the potential number of green
consumer and ordinary consumer is small, subsidy but
no tax is the best choice; when the number of potential
green consumer and ordinary consumer excess some
threshold
points
(
a*g , ag'* , ao* , ao'* ) and

a*g > ao* , a g'* > ao'* , the optimal policies changes. There

Profit

is an obvious difference between two figures, that is,
when the number of the potential green consumer is
very large, there still exists subsidy when the
government determines to implement policy to
manufacturer, while there is no subsidy.

Figure 6. Profit as a function of t

Assume that the manufacturer produces two
products with the considerable marginal profit, and this
scenario is the most common for the vehicle
manufacturers. In this example, we discuss the optimal
government policy with CEA k ge and the consumers’
emphasis on traditional quality

k gt of green consumer.

Parameters are set as follows:
ag  20, ao  60, qeg  0.3, bg  bo  1, r  2, po  15, ce  20,

ct  10, F  50, qeo  0, qto  1,  g   o  0.2, kot  2, koe  1,
2
1
l gt  lot  0.2, l ge  loe  0.1, 1 = ,  2 = 3 = 4  ,  =100.
5
5
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Let k ge , k gt  [0,5] , we can give the optimal zone
division according to

[4]

k ge and k gt .

5

[5]

4.5
subsidy & tax to manufacturer

4

kgt

3.5
3

subsidy & tax to consumer

[6]

2.5
2
1.5
1
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5
kge

3

3.5

Figure 8. Optimal policies with

4

4.5

5

[7]

k ge and k gt
[8]

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present two optimal government
policies with different environmental quality and CEA,
and compare the subsidy and tax policies to consumer
and manufacturer, then give the optimal choice for
government. There are main four meaningful
management insights: firstly, subsidizing and taxing to
consumer is more beneficial when the number of
potential green consumers is small and environmental
technology is high. As the number of the potential
green consumer increases, government should change
from subsidizing to consumer to subsidize and tax to
manufacturer; secondly, whenever government
implements policy to consumer or manufacturer, the
social welfare is concave with government subsidy and
tax, firm’s profit decreases with tax and increases with
subsidy; thirdly, subsidizing to consumer, the social
welfare and firm’s profit increases much larger
compared with subsidy to manufacturer; however, the
tax has almost opposite results with subsidy, taxing to
manufacturer may obtain higher social welfare than
taxing to consumer; fourthly, subsidy and tax to
manufacturer may be more beneficial when either CEA
or consumer awareness on traditional quality is very
high.

[9]

[10]
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